ACK won summary judgment in Wright v. Amazing Security & Investigations, LLC. The action stemmed from a stabbing perpetrated by Plaintiff's minor son at a District of Columbia charter school.
Plaintiff alleged that, during school hours, her minor son became involved in a physical altercation with another student, during which her son stabbed the other student in the throat with a knife. The knife used during the stabbing was smuggled into the school by Plaintiff's son earlier that day when a school administrator permitted him to leave the school building and re-enter moments later. That same administrator failed to contact security to search him upon his re-entry into the school via an unauthorized, unguarded entrance, in violation of school policy. Plaintiff's son claimed he smuggled the knife into the building because he was a victim of bullying and feared for his safety. Because of this experience and the bullying, the boy claimed severe emotional distress as well as damages for injuries suffered during the fight. Plaintiffs sought $450,000 in compensatory damages.
Ironically, three days before the incident, Plaintiff's son was caught by security trying to smuggle another knife into the building. The Plaintiff argued that, had the security company and the school handled the preceding incident properly, the Plaintiff would have been suspended on the day of the fight and none of this would have happened. The school, however, failed to suspend or otherwise discipline Plaintiff's son for attempting to smuggle the knife into school despite a strict policy whereby students in possession of weapons are automatically suspended.
In granting ACK's motion for summary judgment, the Hon. Peter A. Krauthamer ruled that, since one is estopped from profiting from one's own dishonest and illegal act, the security company and the school had no duty to protect the Plaintiff's son from injuries caused by his own intentional criminal acts. It further ruled that any negligence on the part of the security company and the school was not the proximate cause of the Plaintiff's “injuries.”